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Theories impact the movement disorders clinic, not only affecting the development of
new therapies but determining how current therapies are used. Models are theories that
are procedural rather than declarative. Theories and models are important because,
as argued by Kant, one cannot know the thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich) and only a
model is knowable. Further, biological variability forces higher level abstraction relevant
for all variants. It is that abstraction that is raison d’être of theories and models. Theories
“connect the dots” to move from correlation to causation. The necessity of theory makes
theories helpful or counterproductive. Theories and models of the pathophysiology and
physiology of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system do not spontaneously arise
but have a history and consequently are legacies. Over the last 40 years, numerous
theories and models of the basal ganglia have been proposed only to be forgotten
or dismissed, rarely critiqued. It is not harsh to say that current popular theories
positing increased neuronal activities in the Globus Pallidus Interna (GPi), excessive
beta oscillations and increased synchronization not only fail to provide an adequate
explication but are inconsistent with many observations. It is likely that their shared
intellectual and epistemic inheritance plays a factor in their shared failures. These issues
are critically examined. How one is to derive theories and models and have hope these
will be better is explored as well.
Keywords: basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system, model, theory, globus pallidus interna rate theory, beta-
oscillations theory, increased synchronization theory, principles of causational and informational synonymy,
logical fallacies
THE IMPACT OF THEORY IN THE CLINIC
Theories, particularly the prevailing theory, have an enormous impact on clinical practice
and medical science, the latter often determines clinical practice. Consider the Globus
Pallidus Interna (GPi) Rate theory, which posits that overactivity of the GPi suppresses
intended movements, resulting in hypokinetic disorders consequent to the inhibitory
influence of GPi neurons on neurons of the ventral thalamus pars oralis (Vop). Further,
underactivity of GPi neurons results in unintended movements by abnormal disinhibition of
thalamic neurons, resulting in hyperkinetic disorders. This theory is demonstrably incorrect,
and contrary evidence has been available ever since the initial publications of the theory
(reviewed in Montgomery, 2007). Consider the following consequences of the GPi Rate theory.
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Continued Arguments that High-Frequency
Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) Reduces the
Output of the GPi, Improving the
Hypokinetic Symptoms of Parkinson’s
Disease by Reducing Abnormal Inhibition
of Vop Neurons
While there is considerable evidence to the contrary,
this theory does not explain why high-frequency deep
brain stimulation (DBS) also is effective for hyperkinetic
disorders. This hypothesis was based on the logical Fallacy of
Pseudotransitivity, which presumes synonymy between the
neurophysiological mechanisms between DBS in the vicinity
of the GPi and subthalamic nucleus (STN) and pallidotomy
and subthalamotomy, respectively (Montgomery, 2012). It is
important to note that the judicious use of logical fallacies is
critical to the advancement of science when its use generates
hypotheses for subsequent experimental vindication. However,
it is injudicious to use such fallacies to argue in support of
any theory or to argue against other alternative theories.
In this author’s opinion, this theory has slowed progress
in understanding the mechanisms of action of DBS and,
importantly, theories of pathophysiology and physiology of the
basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system. It is likely that these
arguments also delayed the development of better therapeutic
approaches. Indeed, the intuitive appeal of both the GPi Rate
theory and the postulated mechanisms of action of DBS became
mutually re-enforcing, creating a circularity of explanatory
theory, making alternative theories much more difficult to
gain traction. At least the consideration of alternatives has the
potential of being right.
Dichotomization of DBS into High
Frequencies, Associated with
Improvement, and Low-Frequency DBS
Associated with Worsening of Symptoms
of the Disease Treated
There is considerable evidence to the contrary, yet this notion
persists, particularly if insufficient caution and attention are
paid to sampling issues with regard to DBS frequencies (Huang
et al., 2014). However, the assumption of a dichotomization
between high and low frequencies based on the suspect one-
dimensional push–pull dynamics of the GPi Rate theory (see
earlier discussion) persists (di Biase and Fasano, 2016). The
consequence is that the full clinical potential of DBS at a wide
range of frequencies has not yet been explored.
Beyond the Specifics of the GPi Rate
Theory, the Underlying Enabling
Presumptions are a Dichotomization of the
Mechanisms into Two Opposing Contrary
Stable States
In the case of the GPi Rate theory, the two states of high neuronal
activity vs. low neuronal activity in the GPi dominate theoretical
explanations. However, one just as easily could substitute
increased beta-oscillatory activity or increased synchronization
of the GPi for the overactivity of the GPi neurons in hypokinetic
disorders. The one-dimensional push–pull dynamics for which
the two states have been the poles that constituted the basis
for understanding the effects of various treatments. The one-
dimensional push–pull dynamics presupposes the existence to
two steady states.
Consider viewing a grayscale that ranges from white to black
at the extremes. How many colors (shades of gray) are in
the grayscale? Since Aristotle and his notion of the Contraries
(Montgomery, 2012), the answer continues to be just two—white
and black. All the other shades are admixtures of varying degrees
of black and white. In the case of the GPi Rate theory, the
dimension has overactivity and underactivity at the extremes of
the continuum. Disease is occasioned when the actual condition
is at an extreme and normality is at some intermediate condition.
The Cholinergic/Dopaminergic Imbalance theory of the
movement disorders in the 1970s posited two one-dimensional
systems that complemented each other. One dimension was
organized on the relative excess or a deficiency of acetylcholine
in the basal ganglia. The other dimension had relative excess and
relative deficiency of dopamine at its poles. Interestingly, with
the ascendency of the GPi Rate theory, any theories to explain
the obvious benefit of anticholinergic medications seem to have
evaporated, perhaps not unlike the memory holes in the Ministry
of Truth in Orwell’s novel 1984 (Orwell, 1949).
The one-dimensional system surviving the
Cholinergic/Dopaminergic Imbalance theory was a continuum
between relative deficiency and excess dopamine in the striatum,
resulting in hypokinetic and hyperkinetic disorders, respectively.
The stable states relative to dopamine content thus influenced
the notion that dopamine release in the striatum was relatively
constant, giving rise to tonic dopamine activity—this despite
the demonstration by Schultz et al. (2015) of a very rapid but
brief increase in dopamine neuronal activities during a motor
task (Schultz, 1986). This theory led directly to dopamine
replacement therapies that provided constant application of
dopamine (Obeso and Olanow, 2011). However, the failure of
tonic dopamine replacement therapy is seen in patients with
Parkinson’s disease where increased amounts of presumably
tonic dopamine were in the striatum as a result of fetal dopamine
transplantation. Many, if not most, patients did not improve.
It has been only recently that renewed interest in the dynamic
or phasic operations of dopamine neurons has been rekindled
(Schultz et al., 2015).
Presumption of the One-Dimensional
Push–Pull Dynamics Influencing
Biomedical Research
Research attempting to improve the hypokinetic symptoms of
Parkinson’s through genetic manipulation directed at the STN to
reverse the state of the STN neurons from one end of the single
dimension (excitatory) to the other end of the same dimension
(inhibitory) presumes the GPi Rate theory (LeWitt et al., 2011).
One might argue ‘‘doesn’t the fact that pallidotomy and genetic
reversal of the STN neurotransmitter effect demonstrate the
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validity of the GPi Rate theory?’’ As will be seen, these evidences
do not. Theories that seek vindication by a demonstration
of predictions derived from the theories are the Fallacy of
Confirming the Consequence. Note that this is not to say that
the theory cannot be true, but only that the demonstration of its
predictions does not assure that it is true (discussed in greater
detail later).
Presumption of the One-Dimensional
Push–Pull Dynamics and Symptoms and
Signs in the Clinic
The notion of a one-dimensional dichotomy goes back to
Aristotle’s notion of Contraries and was fundamental to Galen’s
notion of disease. The concept found a home and credibility
in the writing of John Hughlings Jackson, called the Father of
English Neurology, in his dichotomization of symptoms and
signs into positive and negative. Paralysis was a negative sign
representing insufficient activity in the motor systems, while
seizures and spasms were attributed to excessive activity in
the motor systems. Extended to disorders of the basal ganglia,
the symptoms and signs were attributed to deficiency and
excess of basal ganglia function, respectively. As there is little
corroborating evidence sufficient to prove the case, it must
be taken as a theory. However, the clinical dichotomization
resonates with the GPi Rate theory, as well as with the
predecessor and successors of the theory, again demonstrating
the intuitive appeal and power of the simple one-dimensional
push–pull dynamics.
Parkinson’s disease is considered the archetype of hypokinetic
syndromes. The diametric opposite in the one-dimensional
dichotomy are the hyperkinetic syndromes, such as Huntington’s
disease. It is a testament to the power of theory, particularly those
that are intuitive and appealing, that contrary evidence would be
trumped. Patients with Parkinson’s disease can have bradykinesia
as well as hyperkinesia simultaneously. Similarly, patients with
chorea from Huntington’s disease are bradykinetic on volitional
tasks.
There likely are many reasons for the power of theories
such as the GPi Rate theory and other one-dimensional
push–pull theories, such as Beta-Oscillations or Increased
Synchronization theories. These range from the polemical,
where proponents of popular theories make it difficult for
insurgent theories (Kuhn, 1965) by not funding grants, accepting
publications, or inviting advocates for alternatives to present,
to ways of observing phenomena and adjudicating what is
relevant and acceptable evidence (Montgomery, 2012). Abraham
Maslov wrote, ‘‘I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool
you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a
nail’’ (Maslow, 1966). Think of popular theory as a very big
hammer.
THEORIES ARE NECESSARY BUT ALL
THE MORE REASON FOR DILIGENCE
Discussions of theory in biomedical research and clinical science
are fraught with difficulty due to misconceptions about the
nature of theory. While theory is readily appreciated in physics,
chemistry and psychology, often theory is a pejorative term
in biomedical research. In the latter, often the presumption
is that theory is just so much metaphysical speculation and
that data speak for itself. Theory is unnecessary. Disabusing
any reader holding this position is beyond the scope of
this article. For those readers, this author can only ask
forbearance. The position held here is that, at the very least,
the facts-of-the-matter, such as observations and evidence
as related to the pathophysiology and physiology of the
basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system, are inadequate for a
complete explication of the altered behaviors associated with
disorders of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system. A
certain amount of ‘‘connecting the dots’’ is necessary and
thus, the necessity of theory to do so. At the very least,
the theoretical connections ‘‘between the dots’’ become the
testable hypotheses for subsequent experimentation and thus
new knowledge.
Models are a form of theory. Models typically are procedural
rather than declarative. They explain by doing but are theories
nonetheless. The great advantage is that models can succeed
in a procedural sense without the necessity of declarative
explications. The latter is discovered post hoc. Thus, what is
epistemically true of any model is also true of theory.
Science is remarkably effective in the accumulation of
facts-of-the-matter. Advances in scientific technology truly
are breathtaking, and other fields of human endeavor to
discover new knowledge are left wanting. However, truth
be told, science is poor at what is most fundamental, that
is, the generation of hypotheses that would be subjected to
the Scientific Method. This is to be expected as hypotheses
necessarily extend beyond the facts-of-the-matter, whether
by interpolation or extrapolation, and thus beyond scientific
technology. Theories, and their specification in models, require
the application of reasoning rather than discovery. Herein lies
a problem. While scientists are happy to discuss technology,
questioning their reasoning seems beyond the pale. Those
that do question reasoning are labeled judgmental and are
dismissed. However, any scientific experiment is only as
good as the hypothesis it seeks to support or refute. Some
scientists just think wrongly and it would be a disservice
to look the other way. Any attempts to generate good
hypotheses are, first and foremost, exercises in reasoning and not
technology.
Whatever theory is, it is not logical deduction and,
consequently, does not carry the certainty of deduction.
Deduction, either propositional of the form if a implies b is true
and a is true, then b is true or syllogistic deduction of the form all
a’s are b’s and c is an a, the c is a b, provides the highest certainty.
The epistemic utility of deduction is that one can be assured true
conclusions from a deductive argument with valid propositions
and true premises. At the very least, one proposition or premise
in any theory cannot be taken as valid or true, respectively,
as otherwise the theory would be fact, law, or principle. In an
important sense, it is good that theories are not deductions, as
deductions do not provide new knowledge, which is the purpose
of theory.
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Fallacies of deduction can provide for new knowledge as
they generate hypotheses that combine to form theories. Indeed,
the Scientific Method, when used to assert a positive claim, as
opposed to denying the claim, is the Fallacy of Confirming the
Consequence. However, as necessary logical fallacies, theories
require great caution in their construction and use, as will be
demonstrated.
Induction is an alternative that could provide new knowledge
but requires presuppositions that risk tautology. For example, if
it is observed that every case of increased GPi neuronal activity is
consistently associated with Parkinsonism, then one can induce
that all cases of Parkinsonism are due to overactivity of the
GPi neurons. However, such experience does not preclude the
possibility that some case of Parkinsonism are not associated
with overactivity of the GPi. The problem is what were the
circumstances that allowed observations of overactivity of GPi
neurons? If it is limited to high, perhaps excessive, doses
of the neurotoxin n-methyl-4-phenyl-1,2,3,6-tetrahydropyridine
(MPTP), then every examined case using such high doses
would have increased GPi neuronal activities. However, as
has been known since 1986, one can produce parkinsonism
in nonhuman primates, demonstrating neurometabolic changes
demonstrated by others as being associated with parkinsonism,
without causing the changes in neuronal activities predicted by
the GPi Rate theory (Montgomery et al., 1986; subsequently
confirmed by Wang et al., 2009). Indeed, the use of dopamine
antagonists and electrolytic lesions of the nigral–striatal pathway
produced Parkinsonism in nonhuman primates without causing
overactivity in the GPi (Percheron et al., 1993).
The same doubts attend the theory that increased beta-
oscillations produce Parkinsonism, as 15–20% of patients with
Parkinson’s disease do not have increased beta-oscillations.
If induction from observations in patients with Parkinson’s
disease was used, then the claim is invalid. Note that
this is not to say that increased beta-oscillations cannot
cause Parkinsonism (hence, a sufficient cause). Rather, the
evidence shows that increased beta-oscillations cannot be a
necessary cause of Parkinsonism. Similarly, DBS that improves
Parkinsonism increases synchronization, which means that
it cannot be true that increased synchronization is causal
to Parkinsonism. Electroencephalographic-evoked potentials in
response to DBS likely would not be detectable if DBS caused
desynchronization (Baker et al., 2002; Walker et al., 2012).
Similarly, a study of M-wave responses in normal subjects
and patients with Parkinson’s disease, with and without DBS,
suggests an increased synchronization of lower motor neuronal
activity in patients with untreated Parkinson’s disease but even
greater synchronization with therapeutic DBS (Aldewereld et al.,
2012).
Perhaps the only other alternative is the use of logical
fallacies, particularly the Fallacy of Confirming the Consequence
and the Fallacy of Pseudotransitivity. The Scientific Method,
when used to affirm a claim, is the Fallacy of Confirming
the Consequence, which is of the form if a implies b is true
and b is true then a is true. For example, if overactivity of
the GPi neurons (or increased beta-oscillations or increased
synchrony) implies Parkinsonism and Parkinsonism is found,
then there must be GPi neuronal overactivity (or increased
beta-oscillations or increased synchrony). It is important to
note that had b in the formal statement been false, then
a would have to be false or the proposition that a implies
b would have to be invalid. Thus, if Parkinsonism was not
found using methods that produced overactivity, increased beta-
oscillations or increased synchrony, then the latter cannot be
causal to Parkinsonism. That Parkinsonism was demonstrated is
at least a partial victory, assuming that the victory is held with
skepticism. Such results are better termed vindication rather than
verification.
It would be a disservice to merely point out where some
current theories and models regarding the pathophysiology and
physiology of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system are
inconsistent with or contrary to facts. Rather, it is important to
understand the factors that lead to the creation of the theory
in the first place, least one repeats the errors. Theories do not
emerge fully formed as Athena from the head of Zeus, they have a
history. As Santayana (1905) said, ‘‘Those who do not remember
the past are condemned to repeat it.’’
METAPHORS TO ADVANCE
UNDERSTANDING OF THE PHYSIOLOGY
AND PATHOPHYSIOLOGY OF THE BASAL
GANGLIA–THALAMIC–CORTICAL SYSTEM
A fundamental question, almost entirely ignored, is where do the
hypotheses that constitute theories come from? Very frequently,
hypotheses derive from metaphors. For example, it was known
that pallidotomy, presumed to silence the output of the GPi,
improves Parkinsonism. DBS in the vicinity of the GPi likewise
improves Parkinsonism. Thus, the reasonable theory can be
constructed that DBS silences the GPi neurons based on the
metaphor, pallidotomy is to improved Parkinsonism as DBS
in the vicinity of the GPi is to improved Parkinsonism. As
pallidotomy silences GPi neurons, DBS in the vicinity of the GPi
must silence neurons.
From the metaphor derives a hypothesis that DBS in the
vicinity of the GPi should silence neurons. It is now a matter of
experimentation to demonstrate the case by recording neuronal
activities within the GPi. As this proved to be problematic,
the alternative was to use a recording of thalamic neurons, as
they would manifest the consequence of increased or decreased
GPi neuronal activities. Unfortunately, proposals to do just
that found hostility. This is an example where the metaphor
relating pallidotomy to DBS in the vicinity of the GPi went
from enabling research, as a method of hypothesis generation,
to disabling research as the metaphor was used as proof against
the alternatives.
METAPHORS AND MODELS
There is a real question of whether any human can ever
have a complete and explicit knowledge of the brain given its
complexity. All one might know is some approximation of the
brain. Thus, at best, all any human can know is some model of
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the brain and that model must serve as a metaphor for the brain,
as the brain itself is unknowable.
Even if it were possible to know everything about an
individual’s brain, another’s brain is likely to be different. Even
if it were possible to know everything about the brains of
each of the two individuals, it would be impossible to know
what it is about their brains that leads to an understanding of
behaviors in common. One could say that specific arrangements
of neurons in person A result in behavior X. One also could
say that a specific arrangement of neurons in person B also
results in behavior X. As those arrangements are different, one
would have to either say that there are as many behaviors
X as there are different arrangements of neurons in every
individual person or say that there is something in the
arrangements of both persons A and B that transcends the actual
arrangements of neurons in order to produce the same behavior
X. The question is what that transcendent entity would look
like.
The notion that there is some transcendent entity that
accounts for the same functions or behaviors despite entirely
different instantiation in the actual neural structure is called
Functionalism. The analogy is that the same word processing
operations can be implemented in a variety of hardware. The
intriguing question is whether that transcendent entity is a
better explanation of brain functions than the actual neural
physiological architecture in any actual instantiation. Then
would not modeling of the transcendent entity have a higher
probability of providing insight than explicit examination of each
instantiation in each individual?
Whether an explicit understanding based on the exact
instantiation of neuronal physiologic architecture is not possible
or whether the transcendent functional entity is a better target
for understanding, the net result is that only modeling is possible.
Modeling is the only option to gain any understanding.
Models are used as metaphors—the operations are to the brain
as are the operations are to the model. Metaphors contain a
target and a source domain. The target is the statement that
needs explication, while the source domain is the statement that
suggests an explication. For example, consider the metaphor
DBS is to improvement of Parkinsonism as pallidotomy is to
improvement. The source domain pallidotomy is to improvement
provides a suggestion as to the nature of the target domain, DBS
is to improvement. Whatever mechanisms by which pallidotomy
produces improvement are used to suggest the mechanisms
by which DBS provides improvement. While this is not
verification, at the least it offers a hypothesis for subsequent
experimentation.
Every metaphor contains epistemic risk, that is, the metaphor
may lead to a wrong hypothesis. The mechanisms underlying
pallidotomy need not be the same as underlyingDBS and, indeed,
they are not. Thus, any modeling is only as good as the enabling
metaphor. The question is how to evaluate the potential of any
metaphor, and thus its epistemic risk.
Epistemic risk involves epistemic distance and epistemic
degrees of freedom. Epistemic distance is the degree of
dissimilarity between the target domain and the source domain.
For example, consider the metaphor kainic acid injections in
the GPi are to improvement as pallidotomy is to improvement.
Although, to the knowledge of this author, kainic acid lesions
of the GPi have not been studied for its ability to improve
movement disorders improved by pallidotomy, the hypothesis
that kainic acid injections into the GPi may improve movement
disorders is not unreasonable and suggests that experimental
vindication may be worthwhile. The epistemic distance between
pallidotomy, which destroys all the neuronal elements in the
target, including neuronal cell bodies, as well as axons in
passage, is not that different from kainic acid lesions that
destroy the neuronal cell bodies, sparing (relatively) axons in
passage.
Epistemic degrees of freedom relate to how many
modifications would be required to increase the similarity
between the target and the source domain. Consider the
metaphor DBS is to improvement as pallidotomy is to
improvement. The metaphor seeks to ‘‘equate’’ DBS to
pallidotomy. Pallidotomy results in the wholesale destruction of
neuronal elements at the site. DBS involves applying electrical
pulses to the site. The question is how many twists and turns
of logic would be required to make wholesale destruction
equivalent to applying electrical pulses? This is very difficult
because virtually every other experience of applying electrical
stimulation has been to excite rather than suppress neuronal
activity (Montgomery and Baker, 2000). Even studies that
demonstrate a reduction of action potentials back propagated
into the soma likely are due to the activation of presynaptic
terminals that release neurotransmitters, which result in
hyperpolarization of the postsynaptic membrane. Thus it is
not easy to translate electrical stimulation to inhibition of
neuronal activity as the link to pallidotomy would suggest.
The epistemic degrees of freedom would have to be very high,
thereby resulting in a high degree of epistemic risk when using
the metaphor. That high epistemic risk has been borne out by
observations that DBS does not result directly in suppressing
neuronal activity at the neuronal membrane. DBS can generate
action potentials at the initiating segment even if activation
of presynaptic terminals result in hyperpolarization of the
soma. Certainly, the direct physiological effects of the changes
in the electrical fields involve a variety of voltage gated ionic
conductance changes, such as sodium and calcium channels,
as well as affecting NMDA receptors (extensively discussed in
Montgomery, 2016).
EPISTEMIC RISK AND ARISTOTLE’S
PRINCIPLE OF CAUSATIONAL SYNONYM
Epistemic risk, based on epistemic distance and degrees of
freedom, is a refinement of Aristotle’s Principle of Causational
Synonymy. This principle holds that whatever mechanisms are
contained within a cause must be the same as the mechanisms
contained in the effect. For example, consider how themovement
of a hand in a pool of water can cause the water to move.
The hand is solid and the water a liquid. It may not seem
that there is any causational synonymy between the hand
and the water. However, the electrons in the orbits around
the atoms of the surface of the hand repel the electrons
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in the orbits around the molecules of water. Thus, there
is clear synonymy in terms of the repulsive forces between
electrons.
If one accepts that the Principle of Causational
Synonymy applies to causal models of pathophysiology
of movement disorders and the physiology of the basal
ganglia–thalamic–cortical system, then current popular models
fail. The GPi Rate and the beta-oscillations theories hold that
there is a gate-like mechanism and that the pathophysiology of
Parkinson’s disease is due to the gate being closed excessively.
This notion is clear and direct in the GPi Rate theory, where
the overactivity of neurons of the GPi shut down activity in
Vop and consequently in the motor cortex. The excessive
beta-oscillatory activity is thought to prevent activations
in the remainder of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical
system to produce movement. Thus, the cause is some
steady-state manifest by excess GPi neuronal activities or
beta-oscillations.
The effect is not at all a steady state. Parkinsonism is not
the relative absence of movements, automatic (habitual) or
otherwise. Rather, the movements themselves are abnormal.
The normal recruitment order of motor units, with small
units activated first, followed by progressively larger motor
units, is disrupted in Parkinson’s disease. The normal triphasic
pattern of electromyographic activities associate with rapid
ballistic movements is abnormal. The normal reciprocal
activities between agonist and antagonist are disrupted. Higher
level synergies of muscular activities over multiple joints
with complex movements are abnormal (for a review, see
Montgomery, 2013). Thus, very little synonymy exists between
the mechanisms of pathophysiology of the basal ganglia
attributable to these prevailing theories and the mechanisms
by which motor unit orchestration is disrupted. The dynamics
of the theories are one dimensional and push–pull. The actual
dynamics represented by motor unit activities are far more
complex.
The great problem for those attempting to explicitly model
activities within the basal ganglia lies in the dynamics that
the models are intended to capture. If these models are based
on currently popular theories, then the models are going to
be one-dimensional push–pull dynamics. A great number of
such models have been offered typically under the notion of
Actor–Critic models.
PRINCIPLE OF INFORMATIONAL
SYNONYMY
The Principle of Causational Synonymy can be extended to the
Principle of Information Synonymy. One can define information
as nonrandom changes in states, either in parallel or in sequence.
The patterns of motor unit recruitment in normal movement
are not random and therefore contain information. Further,
information contained in the pattern of motor unit recruitment
and de-recruitment must be contained in the information
provided to the lower motor neurons, although the information
may be altered based on the properties of the lower motor
neuron.
The classical notion is that the motor cortex—the
predominant source of information to the lower motor
neurons, particularly those that project to the distal
musculature—specifies the time course and the magnitudes
of the forces to be generated. The biophysical properties
of the lower motor neurons then convert that information
into the orchestration of motor unit recruitment according
to the Henneman Size Principle. However, studies have
demonstrated that Parkinson’s disease disrupts the
orchestration of motor unit recruitment, violating the
Henneman Size Principle, which is normalized with
therapeutic DBS (Huang et al., 2012). Thus, any model
of the function of the basal ganglia–thalami–cortical
system must account for the orchestration of motor unit
recruitment.
The GPi Rate, the beta-oscillator, and the increased
synchronization theories do not account for these dynamics
and hence cannot be considered adequate. The information
encoded in the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system,
perhaps with other descending inputs to the lower motor
neurons, must be at least equal to the information contained
in the orchestration of motor unit recruitment and de-
recruitment. It cannot be the case that the lower motor
neurons themselves create additional information, as this
would be a violation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics as
applied to information. The Second Law of Thermodynamics
holds that in any closed system, entropy (considered the
converse of information) cannot decrease. This means that
in any closed system, net information cannot increase.
Information in the activities of the lower motor neuron
that drives motor unit activity cannot be generated from
the lower motor neuron independently of its inputs, such as
from the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system. What can
occur is either a loss of information, perhaps manifesting as
disease, or a conversion of information from one form to
another that preserves the overall information content. One-
dimensional push–pull dynamics, such as underlie the GPi
Rate, beta-oscillator, and hypersynchronization theories, are just
insufficient.
MODELS AND METAPHORS NEEDED
THAT APPROXIMATE THE DYNAMICS
AND INFORMATION OF THE SYSTEMS
MODELED
Any theory, model, or metaphor whose fundamental dynamics
are one-dimensional push–pull will be inadequate. Certainly,
such simple models are more tractable and one might argue
that is a place to start. The program is to start with these
simple one-dimensional systems and to increase the complexity
progressively. Thus, the models can extrapolate from the
simpler precursors in an incremental manner. Unfortunately,
this will not work and holding to this incrementalist agenda
is only likely to delay significant breakthroughs. Experience
with other physical systems demonstrates that at some point in
increasingly complexmodels, the quantitative evolution becomes
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a qualitative revolution in which the prior inferences are unlikely
to hold.
Consider Newton’s laws of motion and gravitation.
These apply well to single bodies, such as an object in
motion not subject to external forces. They apply equally
well to two body problems, such as the moon orbiting the
earth. However, these laws fail in their ability to predict
the three body problem precisely, such as the orbit of the
moon about the earth and both orbiting around the sun.
Rather, this three body problem demonstrates Complexity,
as first suggested by Henri Poincare. The fundamental
property of Complex Systems is their unpredictability. At
some point, increasing complexity incrementally likely
will result in a qualitative change where inferences from
preceding systems that are just an iota less complex fail
to predict and thus explain the behavior of the complex
system.
The facts just described mean that a reductionist approach,
in empirical as well as in theoretical science—which includes
modeling—is profoundly limited. Rather, in Complex Systems,
such as would describe the pathophysiology and physiology
of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system, one needs to
begin with the complex system. Modeling must look to
examples of Complex Systems for the metaphors that will
inform future modeling endeavors, which will be critical to
any subsequent successful empiric understanding. There are
beginnings, such as models based on networks of loosely
coupled polysynaptic re-entrant nonlinear discrete oscillators
(Montgomery, 2004, 2007). While it is far too soon to know
whether this work will prove to explicate the complex dynamics
underlying the pathophysiology and physiology of the basal
ganglia–thalamic–cortical system, at the very least it represents a
radical departure from the one-dimensional push–pull dynamics
of popular conceptions.
Unfortunately, many recent models continue to view
the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system as a sequential
processing system rather than in parallel (Schroll and Hamker,
2013), which likely is an error (Montgomery and Buchholz,
1991). It is interesting that in their review, Schroll and
Hamker (2013) describe both open loop, perhaps analogous
to sequential processing, and closed loop, which would not
be analogous to sequential processing given the dynamics of
information transfer within the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical
system. However, they and others fail to appreciate or
explore the implications for information processing within
the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system in the context of
behavior.
As shown in Figure 1, effects of a DBS pulse in the
vicinity of the STN causes responses with very short and
highly consistent latencies in the cortex consistent with
antidromic activation of cortical projections to the STN.
There is a response in putamen neurons at approximately
2.5–3 ms. This likely represents orthodromic activation of
putamen neurons, and one source would be collateral branches
of antidromically activated cortico–subthamic nucleus axons
that project to the putamen. Similarly, there are responses
in GPi and externa at 4 and 3 ms, respectively, which
are perhaps monosynaptic activations from stimulated STN
neurons.
The key point is that information transfer between nodes
within the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system is very fast,
on the order of 3–4 ms. If a bit of information is generated in
the motor cortex, it would activate putamen neurons 3 ms later
and STN neurons at 3 ms. GPi neurons would be activated at 7
ms, which then would produce posthyperpolarization rebound
in neurons of the Vop at 10.5 ms and then back to the cortex at
14 ms. Next consider a movement that is executed over 1 s. This
means that themotor cortex can drive the remainder of the nodes
71 times during the course of the movement. It also means that
any structure within the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system
can drive the motor cortex 71 times during the behavior. Further,
the motor cortex, for example, receiving information through
what is called the indirect route, could send information to
what is called the direct route or what is called the hyperdirect
route 71 times during the course of a 1-s behavior. Thus,
the time course of information percolating though the basal
ganglia–thalamic–cortical system relative to the time course
of the behavior, called the duty cycle, is very small. The
analogous situation is the fact that each pixel on a computer
screen is ‘‘painted’’ sequentially but is so fast relative to human
perception that events appear simultaneously on the screen.
Clearly, given these dynamics, does it make sense to talk or
model the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system as separate
and discrete pathways operating as open loops in a sequential
manner?
MODELING TO NORMAL FROM
ABNORMAL AND TELEOLOGICAL
THINKING
The problematic nature of inferring normal function from
alternations in the normal subject was well known to the
ancient Greeks and a substantial reason for the reticence
toward vivisection. Research involving lesions in animals is a
study of abnormal animals. One cannot assume that inferences
from lesioned animals or disordered humans will translate
easily into an understanding of normal function. The British
neurologist Francis M. R. Walsh in the early 1900s likened the
situation to the circumstance of gear teeth in the differential
gear of an automobile breaking and causing a clunking
sound. It would be an error in reasoning to then think that
the purpose of the differential gear is to prevent clunking
sounds.
It would be a similar misreasoning to infer that because
disorders such as a stroke involving the STN result in involuntary
movements that the function of the STN, specifically, and the
basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system is to prevent involuntary
movements. There are alternative explanations (seeMontgomery
and Baker, 2000). However, just such a presumption is made
in many of the so-called Actor–Critic models of the basal
ganglia–thalamic–cortical system. These Actor–Critic models
also presumed the highly improbable theory proposed by
Mink and Thach (1993), whose only support appears to
be lifting the center-surround antagonist physiology of the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 7 September 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 469
Montgomery Models and Theories: Critical Analysis
FIGURE 1 | Peri-event rasters and histograms of a single representative neuron in the cortex, putamen, globus pallidus externa (GPe) and globus
pallidus interna (GPi) in the interpulse stimulation period during deep brain stimulation (DBS) in the vicinity of the subthalamic nucleus (STN). Each
row in the raster is the response following a single DBS pulse. Each dot represents discharge from the neuron. Columns created and summed across the peri-event
raster result in the histogram, which demonstrates average responses over time. The microelectrode signal was sampled at 25 kHz. The discrimination of the
microelectrode recordings into spike waveforms indicative of individual neurons was confirmed by demonstrating a refractory period in the autocorrelogram and
absence of a refractory in the cross-correlogram among pairs of neurons simultaneously recorded. As can be seen in the cortex, there is an abrupt short latency
response at approximately 1 ms following a pulse from DBS in the vicinity of the STN consistent with antidromic activation of cortical axons projecting to the STN. At
2.5 ms there is a moderately consistent increase in activity in a neuron in the putamen. The consistency suggests a monosynaptic input via axon collaterals from
cortical neurons activated antidromically. Broad peaks beginning at 3.5 and 4 ms are noted in the GPe and interna, respectively, suggesting orthodromic activation of
axons from the STN projecting to these nuclei (modified from Montgomery and Gale, 2008).
visual system. A critical review is beyond the scope of this
article, but it is suffice to point out that cross-correlation
studies of neurons recorded within various structures of
the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system fail to demonstrate
the type of negative correlation that would be reasonably
expected according to the model proposed by Mink and Thach
(1993).
Teleological thinking and its attendant problems are epidemic
in models of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system, as
can be seen in the review of computational models by Schroll
and Hamker (2013). The method is to begin with the putative
purposes of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system and then
to demonstrate that the model behaves in a manner consistent
with the putative purposes. With all due respect to Aristotle,
the champion of such teleological thinking, and his subsequent
conceptual heirs, this reasoning is to put ‘‘the cart before the
horse.’’ The problems that ensue have been alluded to previously.
THE MYTH THAT OBSERVATIONS OR
DATA SPEAK FOR ITSELF AND THE LOGIC
OF MODELING
Unlike physics originally and chemistry historically later, biology
has not fully embraced formal modeling, particularly in its
quantitative or mathematical sense. There may be many
factors, such as it is difficult to explicitly describe complex
biological phenomena in such a way that the mathematics
give some intuitive sense of the underlying reality, particularly
in a mechanistic sense. Also, there may be a presumption
that mathematical explication is unnecessary, as the data
‘‘speak for itself.’’ Upon careful epistemological analysis, such
a presumption is a myth, but further discussion of the
mythological nature is beyond the scope of this article. However,
if data did ‘‘speak for itself, ’’ there would be no need of
theory. As discussed previously, there clearly is a need for
theory.
In the case of popular current theories of the pathophysiology
and physiology of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system,
it may be that the simple one-dimensional push–pull dynamics
appear not in need of mathematical explication. This does
not mean that mathematical modeling has not been done
for the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system. Rather, the
mathematical modeling generally is a demonstration or proof
of concept. These models demonstrate that when organized
in the right way with the appropriate initial conditions,
the behavior of the model will be analogous to what the
pre-existing theories predict. This reasoning suffers from a
conjunction of two fallacies. First is the Fallacy of Confirming
the Consequence, which in this case is constructed as if model
A of parkinsonism implies increased neuronal activity in the
GPi and increased neuronal activity in the GPi is found,
then model A is true of parkinsonism. The same outcome
attends having b = increased beta oscillation or b = increased
synchronization. The discussions provided previously prove
these arguments false. Note that the goal of modeling is not
necessarily to demonstrate increased GPi neuronal activity, beta-
oscillations, or increased synchrony. This would be, at the very
least, an empty exercise and, at the very worst, sophomoric
and misleading. The argument could be recast as if and only
if model A implies increased neuronal activity in GPi and
increased neuronal activity in GPi is true then model A is
true. Note the claim relating to model A to Parkinsonism
has been dropped. This model, if demonstrated empirically
(in vitro, in vivo, or in silico), would be interesting and
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informative. The next important question is what is it about
model A that it only can result in increased activity in the
GPi?
A major problem with the very large majority of modeling
of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system has been models
presuming a kind of if and only if mentality in the
context of one-dimensional push–pull and sequential dynamics.
Increased neuronal activity in the GPi, necessarily and only,
results in decreased neuronal activity in Vop. Yet, this
is not true. To be sure, there is an initial reduction in
Vop neuronal activity with DBS in the vicinity of the
GPi activating GPi efferent axons, but in the majority of
cases, there is posthyperpolarization rebound excitation. The
posthyperpolarization rebound results in a net increase in
neuronal activity for many neurons. Added to this is a further
increase in neuronal activity likely from positive feedback from
activated cortical neurons projecting back to Vop neurons
(Montgomery, 2006).
Ignoring or ignorance of these complex additional dynamics
risks the Fallacy of Limited Alternatives. This fallacy is of the
form if a inclusive-or b inclusive-or c is true and b and c are
found false then a is true. (In Probability theory this fallacy is
known as the Gambler’s Fallacy.) Note the use of the inclusive-
or, which allows any or all of the entities be true so long as one
is true. Thus, the truth or falsehood of a is independent of b
and independent of c and b is independent of c. Also, note that
with b and c removed for being false, the result is the Fallacy
of Confirming the Consequence. Failure to consider that the
actions of GPi neurons on Vop neurons are more akin to delayed
excitation rather than inhibition would result in the Fallacy of
Limited Alternatives.
The Fallacy of Limited Alternatives is a tremendous
challenge to mathematical and computational modeling.
The mathematical and computational tools are extremely
powerful. For example, genetic and neural network computing
do not even require any a priori knowledge of how the
computational solution should be arrived at. Even if one
were to constrain the degrees of freedom of a proposed
computational modeling by prescribing that the neural
elements of the computational process obey the constraints
found in biological neurons, the process is still incredibly
powerful and can produce a great variety of computational
processes that arrive at the same solution (Marder and Taylor,
2011).
The great, perhaps greatest, value of modeling is the
demonstration that the model has to be the one to predict the
behavior of interest, not that it could predict the behavior. The
reason is that demonstrating that a model has to be the one
that predicts the behavior greatly increases the likelihood that
the model explicates the behavior. Certainly, in practice, it may
not be possible to say that one and only one model can predict
the behavior. However, the effort should be to minimize the
number of candidate models and then search for commonalities
and differences in the dynamics of the model to find those
mechanisms of the model that likely are explanatory, following
from Mill (1843) Joint Method of Agreement and Difference for
Induction.
It is worth considering whymodelers have been so susceptible
to the Fallacy of Limited Alternatives. At least one answer
is that the susceptibility is in the language. The vernacular
has terms such as excitation and inhibition, which are
incomplete and consequently misleading. Rather, depolarization
or hyperpolarization should be used instead. Hyperpolarization
at least connotes the possibility of posthyperpolarization
rebound excitation, and depolarization connotes the possibility
of a depolarization blockade. Further, the one-dimensional
push–pull mental predisposition is re-enforced by conflating
neurotransmitters with actual electrophysiological dynamics
(Valenstein, 2005). Neurotransmitters are the messenger, not the
message. To hold that the neurotransmitter is the determinant
of neural functions, and thus neural functions can be inferred
from neurotransmitters, is like saying the operations of a
computer can be inferred directly from the properties of
an electron. Note that this is not to say that electrons
are not the fundamental element that underlies electronic
computers, but it is the same electrons that underlie televisions
and smartphones. Thus, the properties of an electron are
necessary but not sufficient to understand the operations
of a computer. Most neurological and psychiatric disorders
are disorders of information. Neurotransmitters (and gap or
electric junctions) are necessary but insufficient for information
or misinformation. Holding that neural behaviors can be
inferred from the actions of specific neurotransmitters would
be an example of the Mereological Fallacy (see Montgomery,
2012).
Similarly, talk of the pathophysiology and physiology of the
basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system, and thus by extension,
neural models, is couched in terms of neurons. However,
use of the term neuron carries the connotation that the
neuron is the fundamental unit, anatomically, and by extension
physiologically. This similarly represents a Mereological Fallacy.
REDUCTIONISM AND THE NEED FOR
NEW METAPHORS
Reductionism often is a choice when one wants an understanding
of complex behaviors that goes beyond purely descriptive
(sometimes referred to as the ‘‘stamp collecting’’ approach
to science). The choice to go beyond the merely descriptive
necessitates that the set of behaviors to be understood (the
explanandum) must have a set of explanations (explanans) with
fewer elements. If the required elements of the set of explanans
equaled that of the set of explanandums, the consequence
would be purely descriptive. Thus, reductionism is the necessary
consequence. Further, in science the relationship between the
explanans and the explanandum typically is causal in nature.
Mathematical and computational modeling is no different.
Even when employing methods such as genetic and neural
network computing—methods that are not necessarily
reductive—once the computational solution is determined, it is
‘‘dissected’’ to understand how its ‘‘components, ’’ sometimes
referred to as motifs in network or systems theory (Alon, 2007),
represent an economical set of causal mechanisms.
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Reductionism is relatively easy—all one needs, metaphorically
speaking, is a bigger hammer, sharper knife, or more powerful
computer. The value of reductionism lies not in the reduction,
but in the reconstruction from the economical set of explanans;
a notion often forgotten or never appreciated by scientists.
The goal is to understand the behavior; an understanding the
reduced preparation, be it a tissue slice or a mathematical
or computational model, is the means, not the ends, at
least in the context of any understanding of the basal
ganglia–thalamic–cortical system with the purpose of effecting
a benefit in the clinic. Even aside from utilitarian considerations,
studying a ‘‘reduced’’ preparation on its own is not synonymous
with the notion of reductionism.
A successful reductionism is when the explanandum can
be reconstructed from the explanans. One could reduce,
methodologically, the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system to
a system of neurotransmitter fluxes, but it is highly unlikely
that one could explicitly reconstruct the normal and abnormal
orchestrations of motor unit behaviors in health and disease.
The failure of any reconstruction, defined by deficiency or error,
indicates that information was lost. If the method by which
information was lost is irreversible, then by the Second Law of
Thermodynamics as applied to information, the reduction will
never allow a reconstruction.
In the case of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system,
one such reduction is to view the system as a sequential
hierarchical system. This is implicit in all descriptions of the
system where the putamen is viewed as the input and the
GPi and substantia nigra pars reticulata are viewed as the
output. However, an alternative conception is that the basal
ganglia–thalamic–cortical system is a set of loosely coupled
polysynaptic re-entrant nonlinear discrete oscillators for which
there is considerable supporting evidence (Montgomery, 2016).
Assuming that the theory is true, then reducing the basal
ganglia–thalamic–cortical system to a sequential hierarchical
system will eliminate the important re-entry oscillator
dynamics. Consequently, any theory based on a sequential
hierarchical organization will be unable to ever reconstruct
the behavior due to the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical
system.
The critical question then becomes what is the nature of a
reconstruction? It may be a matter in practice or in principle that
a full reconstruction is impossible; more on this subsequently.
However, one might be able to appeal to the possibility or
approximation of such a reconstruction. For example, it may just
be impossible to reconstruct, in a fully explicit way, the behavior
of any individual given the biological variability and complexity
of the nervous system.However, one canmake ‘‘approximations’’
by appealing to the average of a set of explanans and set of
explanandums, with the presumption or assumption that the
average represents the Central Tendency; the latter itself is
a problematic notion—witness the distinction among mean,
median, and mode as they vive for the claim of the Central
Tendency.
Perhaps the Reductionism counterpart to the average is the
asymptote. In this case, reconstruction using the economical set
of explanans converges onto the explanandum. In other words,
the limit of the reconstruction as the effort and sophistication
approximates perfection becomes the reconstruction. This is
analogous to limit theory used in differential calculus where some
value y becomes dx/dt as dt approaches zero, for example, where
y is the instantaneous velocity, dx is the change in distance, and
dt is the change in time.
Another example is Galileo’s demonstration of inertia using
inclined planes. A ball rolling down an inclined plane will
roll up another incline plane to the same height from which
it descended. As the angle of the second incline is reduced,
the ball has to roll further along the incline to reach the
same height. As the second incline is continually reduced,
the ball rolls further. The presumption is that, independent
of friction, at a zero angle on the second incline, the ball
would roll forever; hence, Galileo’s law of inertia. Yet, clearly
it would be impossible to demonstrate this fact empirically.
Consequently, Galileo’s argument forever would be a metaphor,
but nonetheless a very convincing one. This argument is a
Process Metaphor. In this case the target domain, that being
Galileo’s law of inertia, gets its credibility from the source
domain, the experiment of successively reducing the angle of the
second inclined plane.
The Process Metaphor is endemic to modeling, particularly
mathematical and computational. Typically, one begins with
the neuron as a model, its dynamics described by Hodgkin
and Huxley constructions of voltage and ligand-gated ionic
conductance channels or other abstractions that are more
computationally tractable, such as the FitzHugh–Nagumo model
or simpler integrate-fire neuron models. One then progressively
increases the complexity of the models with the expectation that
the model outputs will converge on a dynamic or mechanism
that can be thought representative of the underlying biology.
As it is unlikely that even an infinitely complex model,
defined here as the practically infinitely complex, then the
credibility of the model is dependent on the manner in
which the model was made more complex, that is the Process
Metaphor.
FAILURE OF REDUCTIONISM AND CHAOS
AND COMPLEXITY
There are notable examples where a Reductionist account has
failed to reconstruct the behavior of interest. For example, using
Newton’s laws of motion and gravitation, one can explicitly
determine the motion of one planet about another, such as the
moon about the earth, but not about the moon orbiting the
earth as both orbit the sun, as described earlier. This is called
the Three Body Problem, which Henri Poincare, and others,
demonstrated that no analytical solution was possible, although
the system could be approximated later and, in some analyses, an
asymptotic solution is possible. Poincare’s analysis was one of the
first indications of the unique situation of Chaos.
It is important to realize that Chaos and Complexity, which
came along later, are not random systems. They are determinant
in that they are based explicably on specific laws and principles.
For example, the formation of a snowflake is an example of a
Complex System. One of the hallmarks of Complex Systems is
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their unpredictability. Indeed, the actual geometry, other than
having six points, of any particularly large snowflake (containing
very large number of water molecules) is different from any
other. Thus, it would be hard to predict any particular large
snowflake, although mathematical and computational modeling
of the growth, as distinct from origin, is advancing (Barrett et al.,
2012).
Many chaotic and complex systems do demonstrate
‘‘structure, ’’ hence information. Note that the structures of
snowflakes are not random. How ‘‘structure’’ arises and how
it can be recognized in chaotic and complex systems is the
challenge (see Strogatz, 2014). The structure in these systems
may be evident in various ‘‘attractors’’ and bifurcations. Other
examples of the dynamics of chaotic and complex systems
include a dependence on initial conditions and bifurcations to
and between metastable states.
Whether or not the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system
is a chaotic and complex system remains to be determined.
According to at least one theory, called the Systems Oscillators
theory, the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system has all the
‘‘ingredients’’ for a chaotic and complex system, including
the highly nonlinear dynamics of discrete oscillators and the
vastness of the potential interactions. There is some preliminary
supportive evidence (Montgomery, 2016). However, what is clear
is that any reductive method or reduced theory is not going to
be able to demonstrate chaos and complexity, and thus not be
able to leverage the dynamics of chaotic and complex systems
for an adequate theory of the pathophysiology and physiology
of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system. At the very least,
the Chaotic and Complex Systems theory should be considered a
metaphor for further research, particularly modeling, of the basal
ganglia–thalamic–cortical system.
Developments in physics, mathematics and physical
chemistry are advancing dramatically, as evidenced by
the Chaos and Complexity theory. There are a number of
other physical–mathematical concepts that, if appreciated by
neuroscientists, could advance our understanding of the basal
ganglia–thalamic–cortical system greatly. It always is hard to
predict which nascent concept will have future impact—witness
the initial tepid reception to the transistor and personal
computer. Potential areas for fruitful scholarly efforts lie in
discrete oscillators (not the kind that use digital signal processing
to generate oscillators that approximate continuous harmonic
oscillators), as these are more realistic in biological neural
oscillators (Montgomery, 2016). Another area that could prove
illuminating is nonequilibrium steady states, particularly as how
they may underlie metastable states associated with chaotic and
complex systems.
AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR THE
PURPOSE OF DEMONSTRATING
CONTRASTS WITH CURRENT MODELS
The Systems Oscillators theory (Montgomery, 2016) begins with
the same loop-like architecture that underlies most anatomical
concepts of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system but
closes them into reentrant oscillators. In doing so, it becomes
clear that the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system can be
seen as a network of loosely coupled reentrant oscillators.
Each oscillator contains nodes defined as sets of neurons
in the various anatomical structures that make up the basal
ganglia–thalamic–cortical system. Neurons within a node are
defined by their shared inputs and projections to the same set of
neurons in the subsequent node. Different oscillators can share
the same nodes thus resulting in a network of coupled oscillators.
The next conceptual difference is that the Systems Oscillators
theory addresses the dynamics of neuronal activities at relevant
time scales. For example, based on a 3.5 ms time for a ‘‘bit
of information’’, such as an action potential, to pass from one
node to the next, the time to traverse a four node loop, such
as motor cortex–putamen–GPi–Vop, is in the order of 14 ms.
This corresponds to a reentrant oscillator frequency of 71 Hz.
This means that the motor cortex can influence the GPi 71
times during the course of a 1 s behavior. Similarly, the GPi
can influence the motor cortex 71 times. Thus, does it make
any sense to call the putamen an input stage or the GPi as an
output stage? Further, information processing does not occur
in a manner restricted to a given anatomical structure. Thus,
does it make any sense to ascribe a ‘‘behavioral function’’ to
any specific anatomical structure, such as the GPi? Does it make
any sense to construct a model with structures identified as
input or output stages or with anatomical structure assigned
a specific behavioral function? The dynamics also demonstrate
that a bit of information received by the motor cortex that
came through the globus pallidus externa (GPe) could affect
the putamen or the STN and then the GPi many times during
the course of a behavior. Does it make sense to talk about
the physiology unique to the direct, indirect or hyperdirect
pathways?
Finally, while most of the neurotransmitters involved in
the anatomical connections within the basal
ganglia–thalamic–cortical system utilize GABA and
produce hyperpolarizations, research has shown that such
hyperpolarizations are followed by rebound excitation. In
some cases, the rebound excitation results in a net increase in
action potential generation, not a decrease. Therefore, does it
make sense to talk about inhibitory actions within the basal
ganglia–thalamic–cortical system? It makes little sense in
modeling the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system in terms of
excitation and inhibition. The dynamics are far more complex
and because of the oscillators, dynamics more likely reflect
positive and negative stochastic resonance, stochastic coherence,
phase changes, phase entrainment and ‘‘noisy’’ synchronization.
Perhaps modeling of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system
might benefit from incorporating such dynamics.
Evidence supporting these conceptualization are addressed
and more extensive discussion is provided elsewhere
(Montgomery, 2016).
SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Modeling of the basal ganglia–thalamic–cortical system
is fundamental and critical for many epistemic reasons.
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Modeling, considered as a procedural form of theory, helps
to understand when direct knowledge is not possible because
of incomplete direct knowledge. Ideally, it is the models
that generate strong hypotheses that, once vindicated by
experimentation, expands knowledge. Indeed, it can be
argued reasonably that models are the only route to any
understanding.
Modeling for the intent of generating hypotheses necessarily
requires the judicious use of logical fallacies. Injudicious use
not only leads to flawed models but also inhibits development
of new models. Further, models and other forms of theory
to not arise spontaneously but are legacies of prior models
and theories and risk inheriting many of the presuppositions
and misconceptions. Among the misconceptions are dynamics
that are one-dimensional push-pull and conflating the hyper-
and depolarizing effects of neurotransmitters with inhibition
and excitation respectively. Also, the Mereological fallacy of
attributing to the part, the function of the whole is rampant as
is reductionism.
The primary but unappreciated value of reductionism is not
the ability to reduce phenomena to simpler forms, but rather
in the ability to reconstruct the phenomena from the reduced
forms. However, there is a fundamental limit to the ability to
reconstruct based on Chaos and Complexity theory. At some
point incremental increases in complexity go from a quantitative
to a qualitative change at which point the inferences from the just
slightly simpler reconstruction is no longer applicable. Thus, the
ultimate goal is to have a model whose complexity is at a level
of complexity on par with the phenomena the model is intended
to explicate. It is not clear that a reductionist approach will be
successful.
If one wants to change the future, in this case to a future of
greater knowledge and understanding, then one must know the
present. To know the present, onemust know the past. The future
of modeling will not likely succeed if it inherits misconceptions.
Modelers of the future will need to rid themselves of the
misconceptions and look to new metaphors by which to fashion
future hypotheses and theories. Fortunately, rapid advances in
physics and mathematics can help, such as Chaos, Complexity,
Percolation theory, nonequilibrium steady states and networks
of discrete nonlinear oscillators.
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